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ADDRESS
THE IMPACT OF SEPARATION OF
POWERS ON NATIONAL
SECURITY
T. KENNETH CRIBB, JR.,* INTRODUCTION
It may be argued that providing for the common defense is the first
duty of the national government. Nothing else the government does mat-
ters, unless our citizens can be defended against hostile attack. Not do-
mestic freedom, because without the means for protection, it can be
taken away. Not even peace, because without the ability to resist foreign
domination, peace is just another formulation for slavery. Tacitus said of
the Roman legions, "They have made a desert and call it peace."
The man President Bush has entrusted with the common defense of
the United States is our speaker at this session. When Ronald Reagan set
out nine years ago to repair years of neglect to our defenses, one of his
three or four key allies in the Congress was Dick Cheney, then congress-
man from Wyoming. From his leadership position in the Republican
minority, Congressman Cheney helped forge coalitions that sustained the
Reagan defense buildup in the face of a hostile Democratic majority.
And the consequences are no less than historic. In conventional terms,
the armed forces of the United States have been brought to peak readi-
ness, as demonstrated in the Panama incursion directed by Mr. Cheney.
In strategic terms, the credibility of our nuclear deterrent has been re-
stored, with emphasis on technologies such as SDI and Stealth that have
leapfrogged Soviet capabilities. In geopolitical terms, we ended our pol-
icy of containing communism and moved to the Reagan doctrine of pro-
moting freedom behind communist lines.
The military buildup, with its emphasis on new technologies, inten-
tionally put additional pressure on a communist system already beset by
economic crisis, in contrast to the growing prosperity of the free market
countries. By the time Gorbachev came to power, he stood atop an edi-
fice that was crumbling beneath his feet. But there was a silver lining for
Gorbachev-if only he could acquiesce to American maneuvers com-
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pletely enough, if only the Eastern European captives would revolt
quickly enough, he still might be named man of the decade by the dis-.
cerning editors of Time magazine.
President Bush delighted conservatives when he named Dick Cheney
as Secretary of Defense. Now a man who was intimately associated with
the Reagan buildup, and especially the defense of SDI, would head the
Pentagon in a period when the calls for unilateral military concessions
would again build. If anyone can manage the military response to the
total disarray of our adversaries, without ourselves falling into disarray,
that man is our speaker today.
Federalists, I give you the former six-term congressman from Wyo-
ming, the former Chief of Staff to President Ford, and the individual
who, as much as anyone in Congress, made Gorbachev the man he is
today-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.
RICHARD CHENEY*
It is a real pleasure for me to be here. The Federalist Society has made
important contributions to the nation's understanding of our constitu-
tional heritage. This particular conference is about one of the Constitu-
tion's bedrock principles. As James Madison tells us in Federalist
Number 47, "no political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is
stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty," than
the truth underlying the separation of powers.1
Today, I want to talk about two major separation of powers issues in
national security policy: notification of special intelligence activities and
war powers. But first, I will begin with a preliminary observation. Ed-
ward S. Corwin, the legal scholar, once wrote that the Constitution is an
invitation for the executive and legislative branches to struggle over for-
eign policy. There has been plenty of struggle over the past 200 years,
but it would be a mistake to conclude that the Constitution simply dis-
tributed the foreign policy powers at random. The powers are distrib-
uted according to a fairiy consistent set of underlying principles.
Broadly speaking, the Congress was intended to be a collective, delib-
erative body. The Presidency, in contrast, was designed as a one-person
office to ensure that it would be ready for action. Its major characteris-
* Secretary of Defense
1. THE FEDERALiST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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tics, in the language of Federalist Number 70, were to be "decision, activ-
ity, secrecy, and dispatch."2 The government works at its best when
both branches contribute according to their respective designs. When
that happens, the Constitution-to paraphrase a forthcoming Brookings
Institution book-can be an invitation to comity and not just to struggle.
Unfortunately, the relationship was one of enormous struggle in the
fifteen post-Vietnam years of the Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administra-
tions. Rather than each branch playing to its unique strength, each
seemed increasingly to be convinced that the other was trying to do
everything by itself. Today-one year into the Adminstration of Presi-
dent George Bush-I can say that both branches have taken steps to
improve the situation.
Congress deserves some of the credit for helping lower the tempera-
ture, but I work for the President, and I want to tell you something about
the way George Bush has conducted himself. The President has used his
powers decisively, prudently, and well. He also has a clear view of his
responsibilities and has been willing to assert his constitutional authority
in the fields of national security and foreign affairs.
The President genuinely respects the role of Congress, but he also has
decided to stand up forthrightly to preserve the powers of his own office.
He is convinced that all branches have to work well for the government
to work well. He is also convinced that Federalist Number 51 is right:
that if he does not stand up for the Presidency, no one else will.3 Para-
doxically, it turns out to be easier to reach workable accommodations
with Congress when the President is firm.
Unfortunately, the general improvement in atmosphere has not
brought about a resolution of all major issues. Let me note two outstand-
ing examples: war powers and the notification of Congress about special
intelligence activities.
Under the 1980 amendments to the National Security Act,4 the Presi-
dent is required to notify Congress before beginning any significant intel-
ligence activity. But the law also allows for situations in which prior
notice will not be given. When that happens, the law requires the Presi-
dent "to fully inform the intelligence committees in a timely fashion."
You will remember, of course, that one of the big issues of the Iran-
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 356.
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 249 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
4. 50 U.S.C. § 413.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
528 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Contra investigation was that President Reagan waited eleven months to
inform Congress about the Iran arms sales. After the investigation,
many members responded with a classic example of "never again" legis-
lation. By "never again" legislation, I mean legislation that reacts to a
past decision by trying to make it impossible for any President to make
the same decision again, no matter how the world might change, or
whatever future circumstances might arise.
The way Congress is proposing to say "never again" to Iran-Contra is
by passing a bill that would require the President under all conditions,
with no exceptions, to notify Congress of all special activities within
forty-eight hours. In 1988, the bill passed the Senate but did not reach
the House floor. In 1989, the issue was revived as part of the Intelligence
Authorization Act. That year's round produced a compromise, which
the President feels protects his interests. However, Intelligence Commit-
tee members have said they will address the issue again in 1990.
Generally, there is no problem with notifying Congress before an oper-
ation starts, or very soon afterwards. But no President can accept a stat-
ute that conflicts with his constitutional responsibilities. This is not just
a hypothetical possibility. For example, preparations for the aborted
Desert One rescue attempt during the Iran hostage crisis began months
before the helicopters lifted off. Under the draft legislation, you could
argue that the President had to notify Congress within forty-eight hours
of the start of the first phases of the operation, long before the actual
rescue attempt. Imagine trying to maintain tight operational security for
that long. And while you imagine it, remember that the lives of the hos-
tages and agents were in the balance.
Then there was the courageous Canadian decision to hide and then
spirit away from Iran a handful of Americans who were lucky enough
not to be captive inside the American Embassy. This included some U.S.
intelligence support activities. According to an August 16, 1988 letter
from Secretary of Defense Carlucci to Senator David Boren, chairman of
the Senate Intelligence Committee; the Canadians asked us to hold off
notifying Congress and we did so. It is worth remembering the atmos-
phere in Teheran at the time. It is clear that the Canadians were putting
their entire embassy staff at peril to help us.
When foreign governments place a condition on the United States, we
can either accept the condition and go ahead with the operation, or say
no to both. In this case, we are talking about allies who were risking
their own lives, at no benefit to themselves, to save American lives. Be-
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cause the President has the ultimate responsibility for protecting Ameri-
can lives, I believe the decision to withhold notification in these kind of
cases, as well as others, has to be his and his alone.
Let me stress that what I am talking about here is a rare situation.
The problem is that the situations will vary from case to case. If Con-
gress tries to define everything in advance by law, it will fail to provide
enough leeway for action that is in our national interest. This is clearly
not what the Constitution intended. Ultimately, the conflict should be
resolved by relying on appropriate political checks and balances instead
of unwieldy and inappropriate legal ones.
We believe that the appropriate standards were laid out in an October
30th letter President Bush sent to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of
the Senate Intelligence Committee. In the letter, the President said, and
I quote:
I intend to provide in a fashion sensitive to congressional concerns.... I
anticipate that in almost all instances, prior notice will be given. In those
rare instances in which prior notice is not provided, I anticipate that notice
will be provided within a few days. Any withholding beyond this period
would be based upon my assertion of the authorities granted this office by
the Constitution.
Two aspects of the letter are important. The first is that the President
has been, and will continue to be, sensitive to Congress' needs. But that
sensitivity is only half of the point. The other half is his firmness about
protecting the institution of the Presidency. We hope the two aspects
together will convince Congress to drop the issue.
I will turn now to war powers. I do not think I have to remind this
conference that every President since the 1973 War Powers Resolution
has believed it to be unconstitutional, impractical, and even dangerous.
Of all of the resolution's provisions, the most dangerous is probably the
sixty-day clock. That provision purports to take away a President's
power to use troops after sixty days, unless Congress affirmatively re-
authorizes an extension. Given Congress' tendency to delay and then
reach short-term, halfway compromises, a sixty-day clock would tell an
adversary how long it has to last to wait us out. A growing number of
members of Congress may be coming to understand the sixty-day clock's
impracticality, but we are far from an agreement about constitutionality.
Meanwhile, we have a responsibility to try to make the government
work, despite the constitutional impasse. For example, every President
has rejected the resolution's constitutionality. Therefore, none has issued
1990]
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reports to Congress that he has been willing to describe as being "under"
or "pursuant to" its requirements. But these same Presidents have sent
reports they describe as being "consistent with" them. The difference
between the words "consistent with" and "pursuant to" makes little dif-
ference practically, but it makes all the difference when it comes to de-
fending executive power. The intention to notify is expressed, but in a
way that preserves Presidential prerogatives.
The most recent report "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution
came during Operation Just Cause in Panama. As you know, H-hour in
Panama was at one a.m. on the morning of December 20. To remind you
of the immediate background: On December 15, at the instigation of
General Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian National Assembly declared
that a state of war existed between Panama and the United States. On
the 16th, a U.S. Marine officer was killed, a U.S. Navy officer was beaten,
and the Navy officer's wife was detained, threatened, and abused.
These events were not isolated. Since February 6, 1988, Americans in
Panama have been threatened with serious bodily harm or death almost
100 different times. In addition, there were more than 1,450 violations of
the Panama Canal Treaties.
All of this meant that the lives and welfare of American citizens in
Panama were increasingly at risk. It also made it clear that the contin-
ued safe operation of the Panama Canal, the integrity of the Canal trea-
ties, and the security of American interests flowing from the treaties,
were all placed in serious jeopardy. Under these circumstances, the Pres-
ident ordered military operations.
A few hours before H-hour, President Bush notified congressional
leaders of his decision. Then, on December 21, well within the forty-
eight hour period specified in the resolution, he sent a formal letter of
notification.
Most members of Congress have supported our action in Panama.
That usually happens when a President's decision works out well. But
there was some criticism about the way the President notified Congress.
Some members said that the President should have consulted and not
merely informed them. Moreover, the frequently heard congressional
definition of consultation is that it should be a meaningful deliberation in
a group setting in which the members have an opportunity to advise the
President whether he should go ahead with the planned operation.
With all due respect, I cannot accept this position, and I do not think
any President could either. Remember: the claim is that the President
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has an obligation to consult. The word "obligation" is significant. The
claim is not merely that it would be useful to consult, or that the Presi-
dent would benefit from getting other opinions. I am sure that President
Bush would agree that the advice of the congressional leaders can be very
valuable indeed. In practice, he does tend to consult when-to para-
phrase the statute-it is possible to do so.
Clearly, however, the issue is not about advice, but about power and
authority. Congress can properly demand a consultant role in advance
of the decision-as opposed to asking for one-only if the power to make
the decision is Congress' and the President is exercising the power be-
cause Congress has delegated it. That is the underlying theory of the
War Powers Resolution. It is not the opinion held by this or any previ-
ous President.
Let me emphasize that President Bush often does find it useful to have
a give and take with members of Congress. The Administration had an
extensive and ongoing quiet dialogue with Congress for months about
Panama. But the decision for action finally belongs to the President. He
is the one who bears the responsibility for sending young men and wo-
men to risk death. If the operation fails, it will be his fault. I have never
heard one of my former colleagues stand up after a failed operation to
say, "I share the blame for that one; I advised him to go forward." The
sad track record too often shows members hedging their bets at the start
of an operation, and waiting to see how it turns out before committing
themselves.
If the responsibility for a decision is the President's, then the responsi-
bility for gathering advice must also be his. However useful it may be to
get members together for a group consultation, history shows that hastily
called group meetings can produce rampant press speculation about what
is going on.
For example, when President Reagan briefed some Senators before the
1986 Libyan bombing raid, the Senators had to dodge reporters' ques-
tions after the meeting. I am not about to claim that this particular chain
of events caused security problems. Press speculation about a reprisal
raid against Libya was already rampant. Nonetheless, you can easily im-
agine similar situations in which a group meeting, followed by "no com-
ments," would raise press suspicions. With today's worldwide electronic
media, those suspicions could easily beat our airplanes to the target.
Of course, Presidents often conclude that a meeting is worth it, despite
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the risks. But balancing the risks is a judgment call. That judgment
should belong to the person who has to order the risks in the first place.
I realize as soon as I make this point, of course, that many members of
Congress will disagree vehemently. We can spend the next ten years
fighting over the point, but if we do that, I guarantee you that the coun-
try will lose. The United States cannot conduct a successful foreign pol-
icy if every constitutional disagreement is pressed to a final
confrontation. The legislative and executive have to agree to disagree,
and then work together to govern. We made some real gains in 1989, but
we shall have to work hard to hold on to those gains and keep moving
forward.
The United States is a global power, with global responsibilities. Our
post-World War II role has raised the foreign policy stakes for most
Americans, and we are now entering a time of unusual uncertainty, op-
portunity, and risk. We know from our history that no policy can be
sustained for the long term, unless it has the active cooperation and par-
ticipation of both branches. Now, of all times, it is crucial to contain
disagreement. When the stakes have to do with the leadership of the free
world, we cannot afford to be paralyzed in an intramural stalemate.
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